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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the impact of sovereign 
wealth funds (SWFs) on global ﬁ  nancial markets. 
It presents back-of-the-envelope calculations 
which simulate the potential impact of a transfer 
of traditional foreign exchange reserves to SWFs 
on global capital ﬂ   ows. If SWFs behave as 
CAPM-type investors and thus allocate foreign 
assets according to market capitalisation rather 
than liquidity considerations, ofﬁ  cial portfolios 
reduce their “bias” towards the major reserve 
currencies. As a result, more capital ﬂ  ows 
“downhill” from rich to less wealthy economies, 
in line with standard neoclassical predictions. 
More speciﬁ   cally, it is found that under the 
assumption of SWFs investing according to 
market capitalisation weights, the euro area and 
the United States could be subject to net capital 
outﬂ  ows while Japan and the emerging markets 
would attract net capital inﬂ  ows. It is also shown 
that these ﬁ  ndings are sensitive to alternative 
assumptions for the portfolio objectives of 
SWFs. Finally, the paper discusses whether a 
change in net capital ﬂ  ows triggered by SWFs 
could have an impact on stock prices and bond 
yields. Based on an event study approach, no 
evidence can be found for a stock price impact 
of non-commercially motivated stock sales by 
Norway’s Government Pension Fund.
Keywords: Sovereign wealth funds, capital 
ﬂ   ows, foreign exchange reserves, ﬁ  nancial 
markets.
JEL: F30, F40, G15.5
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Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) which manage 
the foreign assets of national states have recently 
emerged as a signiﬁ  cant class of global investors. 
Indeed, such funds are already of a ﬁ  nancially 
signiﬁ   cant size, currently probably managing 
between USD 2 and 3 trillion. Sustained 
accumulation of foreign assets could transform 
several SWFs into important market players as 
their ﬁ  nancial assets under management could 
soon exceed those of the largest private asset 
managers and pension funds.
The policy issues arsing from the emergence 
of SWFs as large global ﬁ  nancial players range 
from concerns over a lack of transparency 
and a reversal in privatisations to risks to 
global  ﬁ   nancial stability. For example, SWFs 
could contribute to an unwinding of global 
imbalances through a diversiﬁ  cation out of US 
dollar- denominated government bonds in which 
the bulk of traditional reserves is invested. 
Another concern relates to the question of 
whether such funds might distort asset prices 
through non-commercially motivated purchases 
or sales of securities.
There is indeed a lack of transparency in the 
majority of SWFs. In fact, the seven least 
transparent SWFs are estimated to account for 
almost half of all SWFs’ holdings. These appear 
to be those of countries with relatively lower 
levels of institutional development. From a 
policy perspective these patterns raise concerns 
since a lack of accountability and transparency 
of SWFs may give rise to a further mounting 
of protectionist pressures in the advanced 
economies.
Transfers of foreign assets from traditional 
central bank reserve portfolios into SWFs 
would result in large rebalancing ﬂ  ows as the 
asset allocation of such funds tends to be less 
constrained, e.g. by liquidity considerations, 
and less risk averse than that of central banks. 
The paper presents scenarios which indicate 
that a re-balancing through SWFs might trigger 
a diversiﬁ  cation not only out of US dollar assets 
but also out of euro assets, given that ofﬁ  cial 
reserves are currently overweight in euro area 
and US government bonds. Emerging market 
economies, and also Japan, may receive a larger 
share of SWF investment over time. At the 
global level, this would also imply that more 
capital would ﬂ  ow from developed to emerging 
and developing countries.
However, such calculations ignore the reserve 
currency role of the US dollar and also the euro 
which may remain important for some SWFs. 
Moreover, the scenarios cannot fully consider 
that SWFs may face restrictions regarding the 
currency composition of their investments as 
a large-scale shift of SWFs out of US dollar 
and euro assets is likely to prove incompatible 
with their own governments’ exchange rate 
and monetary policy objectives. Furthermore, 
SWFs may also pursue other objectives, such 
as hedging against oil price ﬂ  uctuations. In a 
scenario in which SWFs were to underweight 
oil stocks, the portfolio shares of Japanese, euro 
area and, to a lesser extent, US stocks would 
tend to rise at the expense of UK and emerging 
market stocks.
While in general a rebalancing of global capital 
ﬂ  ows could affect asset prices, a more speciﬁ  c 
concern relates to the question of whether 
SWFs might distort asset prices through 
non- commercially motivated purchases or 
sales of securities. Although the price impact 
of most SWFs is impossible to assess given 
the lack of information on their investments, 
there is no evidence for a price impact in a 
case study of non-economically motivated 
large-scale stock sales by Norway’s 
Government Pension Fund. 
Over the longer run, any impact of SWFs on 
global  ﬁ   nancial market structure and stability 
will depend critically on the motives underlying 
the investment decisions of such funds. While 
fully return and risk-motivated investments may 
affect ﬁ  nancial stability rather positively due to 
the long-term investment horizon of such funds, 
non-commercial motives might have a negative 
impact on ﬁ  nancial stability.6
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1   INTRODUCTION
Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), broadly 
deﬁ   ned as public investment agencies which 
manage part of the (foreign) assets of national 
states, have recently attracted considerable 
public attention. While such national investment 
vehicles have been operated by many countries 
for decades, SWFs have only recently become 
important players in global ﬁ  nancial markets. In 
fact, the history of SWFs dates back to at least 
1953 when, according to the Kuwait Investment 
Authority, the “Kuwait Investment Board was 
set up with the aim of investing surplus oil 
revenues to reduce the reliance of Kuwait on 
its ﬁ  nite oil resource”. The more recent rise of 
SWFs is mainly linked to the accumulation of 
sizeable foreign exchange reserves by emerging 
market economies as, over the past few years, 
an increasing number of such countries have 
created new SWFs to accumulate foreign assets 
and to improve the return on traditional foreign 
exchange reserves.1
Although there exists no commonly accepted 
deﬁ   nition of SWFs, three elements can be 
identiﬁ  ed that are common to such funds: First, 
SWFs are state-owned. Second, SWFs have no 
or only very limited explicit liabilities and, third, 
SWFs are managed separately from ofﬁ  cial 
foreign exchange reserves.2 In addition, most 
SWFs share certain characteristics that originate 
in the speciﬁ  c nature of SWFs. For example, 
the lack of explicit liabilities (or the stretched-
out maturity of liabilities) favours the pursuit of 
long-term investment strategies, as implemented 
by most SWFs.3 In this respect, sovereign wealth 
funds differ from sovereign pension funds 
that operate subject to explicit liabilities and a 
continuous stream of ﬁ  xed payments, making 
sovereign wealth funds more similar to private 
mutual funds.4 Second, the absence of explicit 
liabilities also has a bearing on the willingness 
to take risk, as standard portfolio theory predicts 
a higher share of ﬁ   xed income securities for 
funds that are subject to recurring payments. 
Finally, most sovereign wealth funds appear to 
have substantial exposure to foreign investments 
or are even entirely invested in foreign assets.
The main group of countries that have 
established SWFs are resource-rich economies 
which currently beneﬁ   t from high oil and 
commodity prices. In these countries, SWFs 
partly also serve the purpose of stabilising 
government and export revenues which would 
otherwise mirror the volatility of oil and 
commodity prices.5 Another purpose of such 
funds in resource-rich countries is the 
accumulation of savings for future generations 
as natural resources are non-renewable and are 
hence anticipated to be exhausted after some 
time.6 Prominent examples of such SWFs 
include Norway’s Government Pension Fund, 
investment agencies set up by member countries 
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), such as 
the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) 
which manages the foreign assets of the Emirate 
of Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), and the Russian oil stabilisation fund 
which has recently been partly transformed into 
a fund for future generations. 
A second group of countries, most notably in 
Asia, has established SWFs because reserves 
are being accumulated in excess of what may be 
needed for intervention or balance-of-payment 
purposes. The source of reserve accumulation 
for these countries is mostly not linked to 
primary commodities but rather related to the 
management of inﬂ  exible exchange rate regimes. 
For an overview of foreign exchange reserve accumulation, see  1 
European Central Bank (2006).
The IMF Committee on Balance of Payments Statistics is  2 
currently working on a precise and operational deﬁ  nition in order 
to enhance the reporting in this area.
The lack of explicit liabilities is not a necessary condition for  3 
ﬁ  nancial institutions to have a long-term investment horizon. For 
example, traditional banks often transform short-term liabilities 
into long-term assets. Nevertheless, from a balance sheet 
perspective, a low degree of short-term liabilities favours the 
pursuit of long-term strategies.
Pension funds often match their ﬁ  xed liabilities that imply a  4 
stream of future payments with investments into ﬁ  xed coupon-
bearing bonds.
For a discussion on the relation between oil stabilisation funds  5 
and ﬁ  scal policy, see, for example, Barnett, Davis and Ossowski 
(2001) and Barnett and Ossowski (2002).
This is the case for many oil producers who, in order to avoid  6 
sharp adjustments of ﬁ  scal policy once oil reserves are depleted, 
accumulate  ﬁ   nancial assets during the period in which they 
produce oil. Thus, oil wealth is gradually transformed into 
ﬁ  nancial wealth, leaving the country’s overall wealth unchanged 
and preserving it for future generations.7
ECB
Occasional Paper No 91
July 2008
INTRODUCTION
As the authorities have become more 
comfortable with reserve levels, foreign assets 
have been moved to specialised agencies which 
often have explicit return objectives and may 
invest in more risky assets than central banks. 
Prominent examples include funds that have 
been operating for decades, such as the 
Singapore Government Investment Company 
(GIC), but also more recently established funds 
such as the Korea Investment Corporation 
(KIC), and the investment portfolio of the 
Exchange Fund managed by the Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority. Recently also China 
established a new investment agency, the China 
Investment Corporation (CIC), responsible for 
the management of a portion of Chinese foreign 
reserves.7
The policy issues arsing from the emergence 
of SWFs as large global ﬁ  nancial players range 
from concerns over a lack of transparency 
and a reversal in privatisations, to risks to 
global  ﬁ  nancial stability. For example, some 
observers have suggested that SWFs, through 
more return-oriented investment strategies, 
could contribute to an unwinding of global 
imbalances through a diversiﬁ  cation out of US 
dollar-denominated government bonds in which 
the bulk of traditional reserves is invested. 
Another concern relates to the question of 
whether such funds might distort asset prices 
through non-commercially motivated purchases 
or sales of securities.
This paper aims to shed light on some of these 
aspects by ﬁ  rst exploring the available evidence 
on the size and investment strategies of SWFs 
including a discussion of transparency issues 
(Section 2). Section 3 presents illustrative 
back-of-the-envelope calculations in order to 
assess the potential impact of the accumulation 
of foreign reserves in SWFs – rather than 
traditional foreign exchange reserves – on 
global capital ﬂ   ows. Section 4 reviews the 
available evidence on the potential impact 
of changes in net capital ﬂ   ows triggered by 
SWFs on stock prices and bond yields. Finally, 
Section 5 presents a case study on Norway’s 
SWF and examines the potential impact of 
non-commercially motivated stock sales on the 
respective stock prices. Section 6 concludes 
with a preliminary summary assessment of the 
impact of SWFs on global ﬁ  nancial markets.
In Japan – the second largest holder of ofﬁ  cial foreign exchange  7 
reserves of more than USD 900 billion – the effectiveness of 
traditional reserve management has also recently been discussed. 
Furthermore, South Korea has announced plans to double the size 
of the sovereign wealth fund that manages part of its reserves by 
2010 and similar steps are being considered in a number of other 
countries in the region such as Taiwan, Vietnam and India.8
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2  SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS IN GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL MARKETS 
Based on a combination of private and ofﬁ  cial 
sources, SWFs are estimated to have accumulated 
between at least USD 2 and 3 trillion, compared 
with around USD 6 trillion in traditional foreign 
exchange reserves.8 However, even this range 
estimate is subject to considerable uncertainty as 
only a small fraction of SWFs report on the size 
of their portfolio.
Comparing the level of traditional foreign 
exchange reserves with assets managed 
in SWFs, two observations stand out 
(see Chart 1): Some countries have been 
accumulating foreign assets in SWFs for 
a long time and therefore hold relatively 
modest levels of foreign exchange reserves 
(e.g. members of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
like the UAE and Kuwait). In contrast, other 
countries have accumulated sizeable holdings 
of traditional foreign exchange reserves – 
most likely in excess of precautionary levels – 
but only recently created SWFs with relatively 
modest levels of assets under management 
(e.g. China and Russia). Therefore, many 
observers expect that these countries may in 
the future increasingly accumulate foreign 
assets in SWFs or even shift traditional 
reserve assets into such funds. 
Table 1 provides a breakdown of major 
SWFs with estimates of total assets under 
management (see Box 1 for a more detailed 
description of major SWFs). Oil exporters, 
mostly from the Middle East, but also 
Norway’s sizeable Government Pension Fund, 
are estimated to account for the largest part 
of total assets managed by SWFs, probably 
between USD 1,200 and 2,200 billion, although 
this estimate is subject to large uncertainty. A 
smaller fraction, of around USD 600 billion, is 
accounted for by Asian emerging economies, 
most notably Singapore, which has been 
running SWFs since the 1970s. But also 
mature economies, other than Norway, have 
set up SWFs, mostly to save receipts from the 
exploitation of natural resources. In sum, a 
plausible estimate of total assets managed by 
SWFs ranges from USD 2 to 3 trillion.
We avoid double-counting by excluding funds which also  8 
qualify as ofﬁ  cial reserves. For example, Russia’s current oil 
stabilisation fund is – in the form of government deposits – the 
balance sheet liability counterpart to the central banks’ foreign 
assets which are counted as ofﬁ  cial foreign exchange reserves.
Chart 1 Sovereign wealth funds and official 




























official foreign exchange reserves
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Sources: IMF and authors’ estimates based on various national 
sources.9
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2   SOVEREIGN  WEALTH 
FUNDS IN GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL MARKETS Box 1
SELECTED SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS
Singapore
The Government of Singapore owns two independent SWFs. The ﬁ  rst, Temasek Holdings, was 
founded in 1974 to manage part of the Government’s revenues. To satisfy legal requirements in 
issuing bonds, Temasek ﬁ  rst reported its accounts to the public in 2004. Total annualised returns 
have been 18% per annum since inception and currently the fund has a net asset value of around 
USD 108 billion. Although Temasek originally invested domestically, foreign investments now 
account for more than half of its total portfolio, concentrated in emerging Asia, especially China, 
Taiwan and Korea and, from a sectoral viewpoint, in the ﬁ  nancial and telecommunications 
industries. Temasek claims not to “direct the commercial or operational decisions of our portfolio 
companies, except where shareholder approval is speciﬁ  cally required”.
In 1981 a second SWF, the Government Investment Company (GIC), was set up to manage part 
of Singapore’s foreign exchange reserves. Although its accounts are not published, GIC reports 
managing a portfolio of “more than USD 100 billion”. The GIC’s investment target is to achieve 
a real return of above GDP-weighted G3 inﬂ  ation. GIC claims to have constantly exceeded the 
benchmark return. 
Hong Kong
Reserve management in Hong Kong is centralised in the Hong Kong Monetary Authority’s 
Exchange Fund. The fund is split into a “backing portfolio” consisting of traditionally managed 
foreign exchange reserves, which fully back the Hong Kong dollar monetary base, and an actively 
managed “investment portfolio”. Management of the investment portfolio is partly carried out by 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority staff and external fund managers. The latter are responsible for 
the management of all equity investments, which account for around a third of the investment 
portfolio. 
Russia
Russia introduced a formal Oil Stabilisation Fund in January 2004 with the aim of saving the 
ﬁ  scal windfall gains from high oil prices. Prior to that, Russia used to operate a less formal 
framework aimed at smoothing the macroeconomic impact of oil price ﬂ  uctuations (“special 
reserve”). The Oil Stabilisation Fund is mainly ﬁ  nanced from two sources: oil export custom 
duties in excess of a reference price and the mineral extraction tax. In addition, the unspent ﬁ  scal 
surplus of the previous ﬁ  scal year is added to the Oil Stabilisation Fund. Accumulated funds 
may be used to ﬁ  nance the federal budget deﬁ  cit if the oil price falls below the reference price. 
If the Oil Stabilisation Fund’s balance exceeds RUB 500 billion, these funds can be used to 
prepay external debt. Since February 2008 the fund is split into a “Reserve Fund” and a “Future 
Generations Fund”. The Future Generations Fund can invest in sticky assets but has so far 
maintained a prudent asset allocation. At the same time, the Reserve Fund continues to invest in 
low-yielding, low-risk government bonds.10
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Norway
Norway’s Government Pension Fund was established in 1990. Since January 2006, this fund 
includes the Government Pension Fund–Global (formerly Government Petroleum Fund, 
established in 1990) and the Government Pension Fund–Norway (formerly National Insurance 
Scheme Fund). The fund receives central government revenues from petroleum activities. As 
regards its objectives, the fund is used primarily as a savings fund for future generations. Only 
the expected real return of the fund can normally be transferred to the central government budget 
and used for general budgetary purposes. The Government Pension Fund–Global attained a 
portfolio value of around USD 373 billion at end-2007. The day-to-day management is delegated 
to Norges Bank but the ultimate responsibility lies with the Ministry of Finance, which issues 
guidelines for the investment of the fund’s capital in shares and other securities abroad. Its 
institutional set-up is often quoted as a benchmark in terms of transparency and accountability. 
The fund publishes quarterly and annual reports which include a detailed disclosure of assets 
under management, the currency and asset class composition of the portfolio down to company 
level and a standardised reporting of its performance against a benchmark.
Table 1 The world’s largest sovereign wealth funds
(USD billions)
Country Fund Assets in USD billion Foreign investment Equity investment
Oil exporters 1240-2220
UAE Abu Dhabi Investment Council 400-800 high high
Norway Government Pension Fund - Global 373 high medium
Saudi Arabia SAMA 300 high low
Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority 213 high high
UAE Investment Corporation of Dubai 20-80 high high
Qatar Qatar Investment Authority 20-60 high high
Libya Libya Investment Authority 20-60 high high
Brunei Brunei Investment Agency 10-50 high high
Norway Government Pension Fund - Norway ~20 low medium
Russia Future Generations Fund ~24 high high
Kazalkhstan National Oil Fund 22 high low
Malaysia Khazanah Nasional Berhad ~18 low high
East Asia  ~585
China China Investment Corporation ~200 high high
Singapore Government Investment Company ~130 high high
Hong Kong Exchange Fund Investment Portfolio ~112 high low
Singapore Temasek Holdings ~108 medium high
Korea Korea Investment Corporation ~20 high high
Taiwan National Stabilisation Fund ~15 low high
Others ~138
Australia Government Future Fund ~49 medium medium
United States Alaska Permanent Fund ~38 medium medium
United States Permanent University Fund ~20 medium medium
United States New Mexico State Investment ~16 medium medium
Canada Alberta Heritage ~15 medium medium
Total 1963-2943
Sources: Authors’ assessment based on various national sources.
Notes: Figures are only rough approximations. “High” and “low” refer to shares above two-thirds and below one-third, respectively.11
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Despite the scarce information available, two 
main traits of the portfolio composition of 
SWFs can be identiﬁ  ed: First, the largest part 
of SWFs’ holdings is accounted for by foreign 
investment, although some SWFs either restrict 
their portfolio to domestic assets or diversify 
across both foreign and domestic assets. 
Second, the share of risky assets in sovereign 
wealth funds’ portfolios appears to be 
substantial, most likely in excess of half the 
total assets. In fact, there is some evidence that 
SWFs have been concentrating their investments 
in the ﬁ  nancial sector. Since 2007, the majority 
of major SWF investments that were made 
Table 2 SWF’s major cross-border equity investsments
(2007-2008Q1)
Sovereign wealth fund Acquired company Transaction value
(in USD billion) (in % of ﬁ  rm value)
GIC of Singapore UBS 9.8 8.6
Abu Dhabi Investment Council Citigroup 7.6 4.9
GIC of Singapore Citigroup 6.9 4.4
Investment Corporation of Dubai MGM Mirage 5.1 9.5
China Investment Company Morgan Stanley 5.0 9.9
Temasek (Singapore) Merril Lynch 5.0 11.3
Qatar Investment Authority Sainsbury 3.7 25.0
KIA (Kuwait) Merril Lynch 3.4 7.0
China Development Bank Barclays  3.0 3.1
China Investment Company Blackstone 3.0 10.0
Investment Corporation of Dubai London Stock Exchange 3.0 28.0
Temasek (Singapore) China Eastern Air 2.8 8.3
SAFE (China) Total 2.8 1.6
SAFE (China) British Petroleum 2.0 1.0
KIC (Korea) Merril Lynch 2.0 4.3
Temasek (Singapore) Barclays  2.0 1.8
Qatar Investment Authority London Stock Exchange 2.0 20.0
Temasek (Singapore) Standard Chartered 2.0 5.4
undisclosed “Middle East investor” UBS 1.8 1.6
Abu Dhabi Investment Council Carlyle Group 1.4 7.5
Investment Corporation of Dubai Och-Ziff Capital Management 1.3 9.9
Investment Corporation of Dubai Mauser Group 1.2 100.0
Investment Corporation of Dubai Alliance Medical 1.2 100.0
GIC of Singapore Myer Melbourne 1.0 100.0
China Citic Securities Bear Stearns 1.0 6.0
Borse Dubai Nasdaq 1.0 19.9
Investment Corporation of Dubai Standard Chartered 1.0 2.7
Investment Corporation of Dubai Almatis 1.0 100.0
GIC of Singapore Merrill Lynch Financial Centre 1.0 100.0
Investment Corporation of Dubai Barney's New York 0.9 100.0
Investment Corporation of Dubai EADS 0.8 3.1
GIC of Singapore Hawks Town 0.8 100.0
Investment Corporation of Dubai ICICI Bank Ltd 0.8 2.9
Temasek (Singapore) Tokyo Westin 0.7 100.0
Mubadala Development Comp. (UAE) Advanced Micro Devices 0.6 8.0
GIC of Singapore WestQuay Shopping Centre 0.6 50.0
Investment Corporation of Dubai Sony 0.5 1.0
Qatar Investment Authority OMX 0.5 10.0
GIC of Singapore British Land 0.3 3.0
Investment Corporation of Dubai Metropole Hotel 0.3 100.0
GIC of Singapore Kungshuset 0.2 100.0
SAFE (China) Commonwealth Bank of Australia 0.2 0.3
SAFE (China) Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 0.2 0.3
SAFE (China) National Australia Bank 0.2 0.3
GIC of Singapore Roma Est Shopping Centre 0.1 50.0
Temasek (Singapore) 9You Online Games 0.1 9.4
Total 91.5
Sources: Company websites and media reports.12
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public were placed in ﬁ  nancial institutions and 
ﬁ   ve large international banking corporations 
alone received more than USD 45 billion 
from SWFs. In this respect, the large weight 
of ﬁ  nancial institutions in SWF investments – 
while only to some extent reﬂ   ecting the high 
weight of this sector in global capital markets – 
might support the view that SWFs could act as 
a stabilising force in global ﬁ  nancial markets. 
In fact, SWFs appear to have taken stakes in 
globally operating banks when their stock prices 
and CDS spreads were negatively affected by 
the ﬁ  nancial market turmoil (see Table 3). This 
could be an indication that some SWFs pursue
mean-reverting investment strategies. However, 
the stabilising market impact of these investments 
has been short-lived, as stock prices tended to 
decline further following the SWF acquisitions 
while CDS spreads narrowed moderately. 
In addition, available data on some of the more 
transparent funds, such as Singapore’s Temasek 
and US endowment funds, as well as anecdotal 
evidence on Middle East oil exporters’ 
investment projects, indicate that private equity, 
real estate and emerging market investments 
account for a signiﬁ  cant part of at least some 
SWF portfolios. Hence, the information 
available on the world’s largest SWFs suggests 
that, with respect to investment style, these differ 
substantially from traditional foreign exchange 
reserves and are instead comparable to private 
asset managers, in particular mutual funds. 
As regards the relative size of SWFs, total SWF 
assets are relatively small compared with the 
more than USD 50 trillion of funds managed by 
the private asset management industry (Chart 2).9 
However, the largest SWFs already now manage 
portfolios that are in the order of magnitude of 
the biggest private investment companies and 
could in the future – to the extent that external 
surpluses are increasingly accumulated in SWFs 
or that existing reserves are shifted to SWFs – 
In Chart 2, we have considered the mid-point of the range in  9 
Table 1 as the best available estimate for total SWF assets.



















































Source: Author’s estimates based on various national sources, 
Investor Magazine, IMF.
Note: Top 5 investors for each investor type.
Table 3 Stock prices and CDS spreads of selected banks around time of SWF investment
Stock price January 2006 - April 2008 (US dollar/ euro)  CDS Spread January 2006 - April 2008 (basis points)
High Low Average Announcement of 
SWF investment
High Low Average Announcement of 
SWF investment
Citigroup 1) 56.4 18.6 45.0 30.7 226.6 6.8 35.7 95.5
Citigroup  2) 56.4 18.6 45.0 26.9 226.6 6.8 35.7 83.7
Merril Lynch  3) 97.5 39.9 74.2 53.9 338.8 15.3 60.9 132.9
Morgan Stanley  4) 74.1 36.4 57.9 55.0 297.3 17.8 55.7 97.2
UBS  5) 63.0 23.5 51.2 49.2 225.3 4.5 26.1 50.8
Sources: Bloomberg and authors’ calculations.
Note: The date of the investments and the respective SWFs are shown in the footnotes below.
1) 26 Nov. 2007 (ADIA).
2) 15 Jan. 2008 (GIC).
3) 24 Dec. 2007 (Temasek).
4) 24 Dec. 2007 (CIC).
5) 10 Dec. 2007 (GIC).13
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even exceed the largest private investment 
managers’ portfolios.10
The growing importance of SWFs raises a 
number international policy issues. In fact, 
state-controlled foreign investments may be 
sensitive both from a political perspective and 
from an economic point of view, as the lack of 
transparency of SWFs gives room for concerns 
about the motivation of these funds’ investments 
and may hence, in turn, aggravate protectionist 
pressures. In fact, the issue of SWFs has been 
discussed in various international fora. In its 
Heiligendamm declaration of September 2007, 
the G7 stated that any restrictions on SWF 
investments should be minimised and only 
“apply to very limited cases which primarily 
concern national security”. In addition, the G7 
called upon the OECD and the IMF to identify 
best practices upon the recipient and investor side 
and both organisations are currently developing 
Principles for recipient countries and SWFs. 
In order to address one of the main concerns of 
policy-makers, to what extent SWFs are indeed 
non-transparent is examined below in more 
detail, as well as if low disclosure practices for 
SWFs are related to other institutional factors 
in the respective countries. Using the corporate 
governance index for SWFs proposed by Truman 
(2007) as a yardstick for transparency, the seven 
most non-transparent SWFs – which basically do 
not publish any information on their portfolios – 
account for almost half of all SWFs holdings. In 
order to shed some light on the potential sources 
of the lack of transparency, Chart 3 compares 
the transparency indicator to two indicators of 
institutional development: (i) an index of the 
quality of the legal system and (ii) an index of the 
democratic accountability of the government.
Despite the remarkable degree of heterogeneity 
in transparency, there appears to be a systematic 
pattern as the lowest transparency scores are 
attained by economies with either low scores in 
the quality of a the legal system or democratic 
accountability. From a policy perspective these 
patterns raise concerns since a low degree of 
accountability vis-à-vis the public, in 
combination with low corporate governance 
standards, may facilitate the pursuit of strategic 
objectives through SWFs.11 Such concerns, in 
turn, may trigger protectionist pressures. 
Note that, in contrast to most SWFs, some of the private asset  10 
managers shown in Chart 2 – in particular hedge funds – are 
often highly leveraged and hence a comparison of assets under 
management may overstate the relative signiﬁ  cance of SWFs.
In this context it should be noted that these objectives can also  11 
be pursued through other mechanisms, such as foreign direct 
investment by state-owned companies.
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3  SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AND GLOBAL 
CAPITAL FLOWS
In order to gauge the impact of SWFs on global 
ﬁ  nancial markets, it is useful to consider how 
an increasing accumulation of assets in SWFs 
could change the pattern of global capital ﬂ  ows. 
In fact, countries with large “excess reserves”, 
i.e. reserves in excess of traditional balance of 
payments needs, may opt for a more return and 
less liquidity-oriented portfolio allocation of these 
assets. Therefore, a comparison of traditional 
reserve portfolios and market capitalisation-
based portfolios can provide an indication of the 
direction of future capital ﬂ  ows.12 
First, excess reserves of major emerging markets 
are identiﬁ  ed using two traditional rule-of-thumb 
measures.13 Table 4 shows that the magnitude of 
excess reserves is indeed substantial, estimated 
to exceed USD 3 trillion or more than half of 
total ofﬁ  cial foreign exchange reserves to date.
As for the portfolio allocation of reserves and 
SWF assets, we assume that foreign exchange 
reserves are allocated across currencies as 
reported in the IMF’s COFER database 
(Table 5, Panel A). As a long-run benchmark 
portfolio for SWFs, we take a ten-year average 
of global market capitalisation weights, broadly 
in line with the available evidence discussed in 
Section 2 (Table 5, Panel B).14 A further 
rationale for taking market capitalisation as a 
benchmark allocation for SWFs follows the 
argument, discussed in detail above, that in 
principle SWFs aim to follow a portfolio 
allocation strategy similar to that of private asset 
managers, which in turn is broadly mirrored in 
market capitalisation shares, provided that the 
assumptions of the traditional international 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) hold.15 
A comparison of Panels A and B allows a 
simple back-of-the-envelope calculation of the 
capital  ﬂ   ows resulting from a potential shift 
out of foreign exchange reserves into SWFs to 
be performed. In a ﬁ  rst step, we estimate the 
amounts invested in the various markets by 
applying the shares reported in Panel A to our 
estimate of global excess reserves. In a second 
step, we compute an alternative asset allocation 
by applying the benchmark weights of Panel B. 
The difference between the amounts invested in 
each market under the two allocations yields a 
back-of-the-envelope estimate for potential net 
capital ﬂ  ows. Our benchmark results are presented 
in Scenario A of Table 6. Three main ﬁ  ndings 
stand out: 
First, a reallocation of excess reserves would 
trigger net capital outﬂ  ows out of US assets at an 
order of magnitude of around USD 500 billion. 
This net outﬂ   ow is entirely due to the large 
reduction in demand for US bonds, which 
currently are still the main investment target of 
most ofﬁ  cial foreign exchange reserve managers. 
However, as SWFs shift capital from less risky 
A similar approach is taken by Jen (2007). 12 
Excess reserves are deﬁ   ned as foreign exchange reserves is  13 
excess of both (i) the difference between actual foreign exchange 
reserves and the value of three months of imports; and (ii) the 
difference between actual foreign exchange reserves and total 
short-term external debt.
In fact, taking into account that the new investments of SWFs  14 
would span over a long time horizon, current market capitalisation 
weights are unlikely to still be accurate. In addition, SWFs 
may have an impact on market capitalisation weight through 
their own investment decisions, thus generating “second-round 
effects” which SWFs would ideally also factor into their optimal 
portfolio considerations.
See, for example, Solnik (1974) and Roll (1977). 15 









China 1,559 254 231 1,306
Russia 420 70 53 350
Saudi Arabia 276 34 22 242
Taiwan 261 67 26 194
Korea 244 109 3 135
India 202 72 15 129
Brazil 175 37 66 110
Algeria 99 10 0 90
Libya 79 6 1 73
Singapore 149 85 40 64
Others 959 332
Total 4,322 3,023
Sources: IMF (WEO) estimates for 2007 and authors’ 
calculations. 
Note: Excess reserves are computed as the difference between 
foreign exchange reserves and the maximum of three-month 
import values and total short-term external debt.15
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bond markets to more risky equity markets, the 
outﬂ   ow out of the US bond market is partly 
offset by an inﬂ   ow into US equity markets, 
given the large size of US equity markets, which 
currently account for roughly 45% of world 
stock market capitalisation.
Second, this simple exercise also suggests net 
capital outﬂ  ows out of euro area assets. As Table 6 
shows, the net inﬂ  ow into euro area equities of 
around USD 200 billion would be more than 
offset by net outﬂ  ows from euro area bonds of 
around USD 400 billion. In other words, ofﬁ  cial 
reserve assets are currently more overweighted in 
euro area bonds than underweighted in euro area 
equities, when taking portfolios based on market 
capitalisation as a benchmark. 
Third, the counterpart of these net outﬂ  ows from 
the United States and the euro area are mainly 
Japan and emerging economies, reﬂ  ecting  the 
relatively large weight of these countries in global 
capital markets compared with their negligible 
role as reserve currencies. In fact, aggregating 
net capital ﬂ  ows of developed countries (i.e. the 
United States, the euro area, the UK and Japan) 
shows that capital would ﬂ  ow from developed to 
“other”, i.e. emerging and developing, countries. 
This ﬁ  nding is in line with standard neoclassical 
predictions according to which capital should 
Table 5 Benchmark allocations for foreign exchange reserves and SWFs
(percentages)
US Euro area Japan UK Others
Panel A: Actual allocation of emerging economies’ foreign exchange reserves
Stock market 0 0000
Bond market 60.5 28.6 2.6 5.9 2.4
Panel B: SWFs (assumed to be invested according to market capitalisation)
Stock market 44.5 15.1 9.5 7.7 23.2
Bond market 41.7 24.9 15.9 4.3 13.2
Sources: IMF (COFER) and authors’ estimates.
Table 6 Simulation of net capital flows for reallocation of reserves towards SWFs
(in USD billions)
Scenario A: Benchmark results for diversiﬁ  cation across regions and markets
US Euro area Japan UK Others Total
Stock market 538 183 115 93 281 1,209
Bond market -1,073 -413 210 -100 167 -1,209
Total -534 -230 325 -7 447
Scenario B: Share of US/euro securities in bond holding unchanged
Stock market 538 183 115 93 281 1,209
Bond market -732 -346 -31 -71 -29 -1,209
Total -193 -163 83 22 252
Scenario C: Diversiﬁ  cation only between US and euro area bond markets 
Stock market 000000
Bond market -142 142 0 0 0 0
Total -142 142 0 0 0
Scenario D: Diversiﬁ  cation only between US and euro area
Stock market 804 273 0 0 0 1,077
Bond market -817 -260 0 0 0 -1,077
Total -13 13 0 0 0
Source: Authors’ estimates.16
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indeed ﬂ  ow from rich to poor countries because 
of higher returns to capital in the latter. In fact, 
one element of the so-called “Lucas paradox” 
according to which capital tends in reality to 
rather  ﬂ   ow “uphill” has in recent years been 
the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves 
by emerging and developing countries.16 Such 
purchases of foreign exchange generate – when 
invested in the major reserve currencies – a 
capital outﬂ   ow from developing to developed 
countries. The resulting “reserve portfolio bias” 
stems from the fact that emerging and developing 
countries have so far played only a negligible role 
as issuers of reserve currencies due to a lack of 
ﬁ  nancial development – in particular in terms of 
large and liquid capital markets. In a situation in 
which SWFs behave as CAPM-type investors and 
thus allocate foreign assets according to risk and 
return rather than liquidity considerations, ofﬁ  cial 
portfolios lose this “bias” towards the major 
reserve currencies. As a result, more capital ﬂ  ows 
“downhill”. In fact, anecdotal evidence as well 
as some available data on Singapore’s Temasek 
suggest that many SWFs indeed have an already 
high exposure to emerging markets.17
An alternative scenario accounts for the fact that 
under a ﬁ  xed exchange rate regime the optimal 
weight of anchor-currency denominated bonds 
may be higher as these tend to reduce the volatility 
of the portfolio.18 In order to account for this effect, 
Scenario B of Table 6 assumes that the fraction 
that remains invested in bond markets is not 
reallocated according to market capitalisation 
weights but continues to be invested across 
currencies like traditional foreign exchange 
reserves, i.e. roughly two-thirds in US and 
one-third in euro area securities. However, this 
assumption does not qualitatively change the 
ﬁ  ndings with respect to the previous scenario, as 
outﬂ  ows from the euro area bond market still offset 
the inﬂ  ow in the euro area equity market. Hence, 
even modest shifts out of bonds and into equities 
by ofﬁ  cial investors could trigger an outﬂ  ow out of 
euro area assets given that the euro area accounts 
for a smaller share of the global stock market.
In reality, major shifts in the composition of 
sovereign portfolios will only occur gradually over 
a longer run. In fact, SWFs may ﬁ  nd it difﬁ  cult 
to fully diversify across regions according to 
market capitalisation weights and may hence, in 
the short run, only invest in the largest and most 
liquid markets. Therefore, Scenario C in Table 6 
illustrates how an initially limited diversiﬁ  cation 
could play out on global bond markets over the 
short run if SWFs invest only in US and euro area 
bond markets while it is assumed that the other 
regions receive no additional capital ﬂ  ows. In this 
case, the overweight US dollar assets in foreign 
exchange reserves would lead to net outﬂ  ows of 
the US bond market of around USD 150 billion, 
which would have to be absorbed entirely by the 
euro area bond market, given the relatively larger 
market capitalisation of euro area bond markets 
than reﬂ  ected in the actual allocation of foreign 
exchange reserves. The magnitude of capital 
outﬂ   ows from the United States into the euro 
area, however, depends largely on the assumption 
that additional funds are not invested in equity 
markets. Scenario D of Table 6 shows that, to the 
extent that funds are invested partly in equities, 
capital ﬂ  ows into the euro area are much smaller. 
Assuming that 40% are invested in equities, the 
simulation suggests virtually no net ﬂ  ows from 
the United States to the euro area. 
Obviously, the asset allocation of SWFs may 
also reﬂ  ect other considerations. For example, 
oil-exporting countries may want to use 
their SWF assets to hedge against oil price 
ﬂ   uctuations. In this case, standard portfolio 
theory would suggest that the SWFs should 
underweight assets that are strongly correlated 
with oil prices. As shown in Chart 4, daily 
returns on energy stocks are correlated with oil 
This observation has already been made by Prasad, Rajan and  16 
Subramanian (2007) and Bracke, Bussière, Fidora and Straub 
(2008). The broader academic literature on the Lucas paradox 
has mainly focused on private capital ﬂ  ows and the fact that 
risk-adjusted returns to capital in developing countries may not 
be as high as suggested by a low capital/labour ratio. The latter 
may stem from private capital ﬂ  ows, referring to institutional 
deﬁ  ciencies in developing countries such as repeated defaults 
on government debt (Gertler and Rogoff, 2000) or the risk of 
expropriation (Stulz, 2006).
In the case of Temasek, emerging economies are even clearly  17 
overweight, accounting for 40% of the total portfolio against a 
portfolio weight of only 20% of OECD economies excluding Korea.
See Beck and Rahbari (2008) and Fidora, Fratzscher and  18 
Thimann (2007).17
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price returns. Therefore, an investment strategy 
that underweights energy stocks would reduce 
the variance of a typical SWF portfolio.
Underweighting energy stocks would also have 
an important implication for the geographical 
portfolio allocation of SWFs, since the share of 
energy companies in total market capitalisation 
differs widely across regions (Chart 5). 
Therefore, such a strategy would tend to raise 
the portfolio shares of Japanese, euro area and, 
to a lesser extent, US stocks at the expense of 
UK and other (mostly emerging market) stocks. 
More generally, SWFs may also wish to exploit 
other positive or negative correlations between 
assets in their national balance sheet and 
marketable assets such as company stocks. 
Our simulations are subject to overly simplifying 
assumptions and several caveats. First, 
diversiﬁ   cation strategies as simulated above 
may be incompatible with some countries’ 
macroeconomic and exchange rate policies. 
In fact, large shifts out of US dollars could 
trigger an appreciation of domestic currencies 
against the US dollar, requiring increased 
intervention to stem this appreciation.19 In 
addition, liquidity considerations may still be of 
relevance for some SWFs.20 In particular funds 
that have been established for macroeconomic 
stabilisation objectives could continue to invest 
in highly liquid instruments and hence remain 
overweight in US dollar and euro bonds. As a 
result, inertia in the currency composition of 
foreign assets could play out more notably than 
assumed in Scenario B. Also, reference currency 
considerations could lead to different allocations 
by sovereign wealth funds – in particular in 
countries which have increased the share of the 
euro in their exchange rate baskets (e.g. Russia). 
For example, using the local currency as the 
reference currency in countries with pegged or 
managed exchange rates leads to large optimal 
portfolio weights of foreign assets denominated 
in the respective anchor currency.21
See also the literature on the so-called “Bretton Woods II”  19 
system, which argues that emerging market central banks might 
therefore  ﬁ   nd it difﬁ   cult to diversify their foreign exchange 
reserves (e.g. Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, Garber, 2004).
See Chinn and Frankel (2006) on the determinants of reserve  20 
currencies.
See Beck and Rahbari (2008) and Fidora, Fratzscher and  21 
Thimann (2007).
Chart 5 Share of oil company stocks in total 
market capitalisation



















x-axis: % of total market capitalisation
Sources: Datastream and ECB calculations.
Note: Market capitalisation ﬁ  gures refer to Q4 2006.


































Sources: Bloomberg and authors’ calculations.
Notes: The sectoral indices are the MSCI World sector indices. 
The correlations have been computed for daily returns between 
1 January 1995 and 6 February 2008.18
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4   THE IMPACT ON EXCHANGE RATES AND 
ASSET PRICES 
The question as to whether capital ﬂ  ows 
triggered by investments of SWFs can impact 
ﬁ   nancial market prices is extremely difﬁ  cult 
to answer or even quantify. So far, no rigorous 
study has been performed to address this 
question. A review of related literature suggests 
that SWFs could have an impact on asset prices 
and exchange rates through price pressures or a 
change in risk aversion.
A direct impact on asset prices or exchange 
rates through price pressures triggered by 
SWF demand (e.g. equities) or supply 
(e.g. government bonds) is only conceivable 
if the demand curve in the respective markets 
is downward-sloping. While there is some 
empirical evidence for price pressures in 
certain markets, it remains controversial how 
persistent such effects are (see Box 2). In 
addition, studies aimed at examining the 
impact of capital flows on asset prices have 
been confronted with endogeneity and 
identification challenges, since it is uncertain 
whether capital flows into specific markets 
because investors expect a high return or 
whether the returns are affected by the 
capital flows.22
Among the studies surveyed in Box 2, Froot, O’Connell and  22 
Seasholes (2001) and Warnock and Warnock (2006) address 
these endogeneity issues to some extent.
Box 2
PRICE PRESSURES IN FINANCIAL MARKETS: A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE
According to the efﬁ   cient market hypothesis, demand curves for ﬁ   nancial assets are 
horizontal. However, a large body of empirical literature has documented the existence of 
downward-sloping demand curves and “price pressure” in ﬁ  nancial markets. Conceptually, 
the price pressure hypothesis is closely related to the notion of imperfect substitutability 
between ﬁ  nancial assets, as pointed out ﬁ  rst by Scholes (1972). In particular, it has been 
found that large block trades may have an impact on asset prices. Due to the difﬁ  culty 
of disentangling price pressure and information effects, empirical research on the issue 
has often studied the price impact of announcements which are unlikely to contain new 
information about the assets.
Equity markets
In the earlier literature on price pressures, researchers have documented individual stock 
price reactions to large block trades.1 However, these price reactions may also reﬂ  ect new 
information about the respective stocks. Therefore, subsequent “event studies” have examined 
the price impact of stock inclusions into major stock market indices and found signiﬁ  cant 
price pressure effects in an environment where information effects probably play almost 
no role.2 Several other earlier studies, however, ﬁ  nd little support for the price-pressure 
1  Negative (positive) price reactions to large block sales (purchases) have been documented by Scholes (1972), Holthausen, Leftwich 
and Mayers (1984) and Mikkelson and Partch (1985).
2  See Harris and Gurel (1986) as well as Shleifer (1986). According to the ﬁ  ndings by Harris and Gurel, immediately after an addition 
is announced, stock prices increase by more than 3%. This increase is nearly fully reversed after two weeks. In Shleifer’s event study, 
stocks newly included in the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index reaped a signiﬁ  cant positive abnormal return at the announcement of the 
inclusion and this return did not disappear for at least ten days after the inclusion.19
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AND ASSET PRICES  hypothesis and a downward-sloping demand curve.3 More recently, more convincing support 
for downward-sloping demand curves for stocks in a case which appears unambiguously 
free of information has been provided by Kaul, Mehrotra and Morck (2000). Outside the 
framework of event studies Levin and Wright (2006) examine downward-sloping demand 
curves for stocks econometrically. In addition, Froot, O’Connell and Seasholes (2001) ﬁ  nd 
that portfolio inﬂ  ows have positive forecasting power for future equity returns, in particular 
in the emerging markets.
Bond markets
Changes in government bond yields and the yield curve have traditionally been linked to the 
announcement of macroeconomic news.4 A recent study shows that “orderﬂ  ow imbalances” 
signiﬁ   cantly affect government bond yields on days without major macroeconomic 
announcements (Brandt and Kavajecz, 2004). In addition, Warnock and Warnock (2006) 
provide econometric evidence for foreign ofﬁ  cial purchases of US government bonds having a 
large and signiﬁ  cant impact on US bond yields. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2007) 
study a case in which the aggregate demand curve for the convenience provided by Treasury debt 
(e.g. through high liquidity) is downward sloping.5 Changes in the supply of Treasury debt 
are used to trace out the demand for convenience. Interestingly, disaggregated estimates of 
convenience demand suggest that the demand for Treasury debt from foreign ofﬁ  cial holders 
(i.e. central banks) is very inelastic, consistent with the view that a stable demand for US assets 
has helped to ﬁ  nance the US current account deﬁ  cit. An exit of foreign central banks from the 
US Treasury market would prompt US investors to buy these securities, but at a lower price, 
implying a rise in US government bond yields.
Foreign exchange markets
In foreign exchange markets, the early portfolio balance literature has motivated downward-
sloping demand curves by postulating imperfect substitutability between domestic and 
foreign bonds. However, the traditional portfolio balance approach enjoyed little empirical 
support. The resilience of foreign exchange markets is also at the core of the literature 
on central bank interventions (e.g. Dominquez, 2003). While the conceptual case for the 
effectiveness of sterilised interventions has remained controversial, recent empirical studies 
do provide evidence for an exchange rate effect of such interventions. Besides the traditional 
portfolio effect, central bank intervention may also have an impact on the exchange rates as 
it reveals information about future monetary policy through a “signalling effect”. Therefore, 
studies on central bank interventions have remained ambiguous about the nature of the 
exchange rate effect. The surge in gross cross-border capital ﬂ  ows since the 1990s has 
3  Hess and Frost (1982), using data on new issues of utility stocks, ﬁ  nd that rates of return appear to be uncorrelated with the size of the 
new issue. Jain (1987) provides evidence that excess returns following the S&P decisions to include or exclude stocks in its indexes is 
not explained by the price pressure hypothesis. Kalay and Shirnrat (1987) ﬁ  nd that an announcement of new equity issues has not only 
a negative effect on stock prices but also a signiﬁ  cant negative effect on bond prices. They interpret this as being consistent with the 
information hypothesis because new equity issues lead to a reduction in ﬁ  rm value and, thus, a negative effect on bond price.
4  Strong empirical support for the impact of macroeconomic announcement on bond yields is found, for example, by Fleming and 
Remolona (1997, 1999). For a theoretical model relating macroeconomic news to bond yields, see Piazzesi (2003).
5  As a consequence, corporate bond spreads are not only driven by default risk and a risk premium, but also by the convenience yield of 
US Treasuries. Therefore, a low (high) US debt/GDP ratio has historically been associated with high (low) corporate bond spreads, as 
in this situation the marginal convenience of US Treasury debt is high, causing the price of Treasuries to rise (fall) and their yields to 
decline (rise).20
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The emergence of SWFs as the main managers 
of foreign assets could also have an impact on 
asset prices through a rise in global risk aversion, 
given their return-orientation and longer-term 
investment horizon. In the literature, the pricing 
of risky assets relative to safe assets, often 
phrased in terms of the “equity premium”, has 
been linked to the average level of risk aversion. 
In such an environment, growing SWFs could 
trigger a decline in risk aversion at the global 
level, which would lead to a rise in bond yields 
and a decline in the equity premium.23 
Most empirical estimates on the yield impact of 
US Treasury buying by foreign central banks 
range from around 20 to around 100 basis points 
(see Table 7). As discussed in Section 3, these 
ﬂ  ows could be reversed to some extent if excess 
reserves are transferred to SWFs. Therefore, 
such estimates can also be considered as an 
estimate of the possible rise in bond yields due 
to the emergence of SWFs. 
In the context of SWFs, Jen and Miles (2007) argue that  23 
according to a modiﬁ  ed version of the Barro (2005) model, the 
growing importance of SWFs could considerably drive down 
global risk aversion, raising US government bond yields by 
30-40 basis points and the price-earnings ratio by 5-10%.
triggered renewed interest in the portfolio channel for exchange rates.6 At the same time, 
the market microstructure literature has highlighted that currency order ﬂ  ows are strongly 
correlated with exchange rate returns (Evans and Lyons, 2002). Finally, recent event studies 
on foreign exchange markets also ﬁ  nd indications for price effects. Hau, Massa and Peress 
(2005) show that a redeﬁ  nition of the MSCI international equity index – which has implied 
large changes in the representation of different countries – led to strong exogenous equity 
ﬂ  ows by index funds and an appreciation of the respective exchange rates.
6  Hau and Rey (2003) provide micro foundations to the portfolio balance theory and derive a positive correlation between capital ﬂ  ows 
and exchange rate returns. Froot and Ramadorai (2004) document, in a VAR framework, persistent exchange rate effects related to 
institutional investor ﬂ  ows. Using a new identiﬁ  cation approach, Hau and Rey (2004) ﬁ  nd that portfolio ﬂ  ow shocks appreciate the 
exchange rate and generate excess returns in foreign equity markets.
Table 7 The effect of foreign central bank 
buying on US Treasury yields
(in basis points)
Source Estimated reduction
Banque de France (2005) 125
Bernanke et al. (2004) 50-100
BIS (2006) ~ 0
Goldman Sachs (2004) 40
IXIS (2005) 75
JP Morgan (2005) 30-50
Krishnamurthy and 
Vissing-Jorgensen (2007)  20-55
Merrill Lynch (2005) 30
Morgan Stanley (2005) 100-150
PIMCO (2005) 100
Roubini and Setser (2005) 200
Truman (2005) 75
Vanguard Group (2005) ~ 0
Warnock and Warnock (2006) 9021
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5   A CASE STUDY ON PRICE PRESSURE: 
NORWAY’S GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND
This section examines the potential impact of 
portfolio rebalancing of SWFs on asset prices 
using data on Norway’s SWF, for which detailed 
information on the portfolio composition is 
available. In particular, we examine whether 
large-scale equity sales of the Government 
Pension Fund due to non-economic motives 
can have a signiﬁ  cant impact on equity prices. 
Norway’s Ministry of Finance has established 
Ethical Guidelines for the Government Pension 
Fund-Global that allow for the exclusion of 
a stock from the SWF’s portfolio based on 
non-economic considerations. An “Advisory 
Council” within the Ministry of Finance has 
been mandated to review the fund’s investments 
and assess whether these might “imply an 
unacceptable risk of complicity” in the violation 
of the ethical principles underlying the Fund’s 
Ethical Guidelines. Upon the Advisory Council’s 
recommendation, the Ministry of Finance can 
exclude a particular company’s stocks from the 
Fund’s investment universe. 
The timing of the process of exclusion of a 
particular corporation’s stocks from the Fund’s 
investment universe is as follows: ﬁ  rst,  the 
Advisory Council issues a recommendation 
to exclude a particular stock from the Fund’s 
investment universe. This recommendation 
is initially not published. The Ministry of 
Finance then decides on whether to exclude 
the company from the portfolio and instructs 
Norges Bank to divest from the respective 
company within a deadline of, on average, 
around two months. Once the stocks have 
been excluded from the Fund’s portfolio the 
exclusion is announced to the public. 
The Ministry of Finance has so far 
always followed the Advisory Council’s 
recommendations and instructed Norges Bank 
to exclude companies in 28 cases, mostly on 
account of their involvement in the diffusion of 
certain military armament but also because of 
the violation of human rights and environmental 
considerations.24
The exclusion of securities from the Fund’s 
investment universe constitutes a natural 
experiment that is particularly well-suited for 
analysing the potential impact of the investment 
behaviour of SWFs on ﬁ  nancial markets for two 
reasons: ﬁ  rst, the exclusion is based on purely 
non-economic criteria. Hence, the exclusion 
is unlikely to reﬂ   ect the Fund’s expectations 
or private information on future performance. 
Second, the timing and modalities of the 
exclusion enable two potential channels through 
which the exclusion might have an impact on 
the stocks returns to be distinguished: (i) during 
the period within which Norges Bank divests 
from a particular stock, abnormal returns on the 
company’s stocks would reﬂ  ect the pure impact 
of the decrease in demand; (ii) on the day of the 
public announcement of the exclusion, abnormal 
returns can be interpreted as a signalling impact 
This includes Singapore Technologies Engineering, which had  24 
been excluded by the Petroleum Fund Advisory Commission on 
International Law, the predecessor of the Advisory Council. The 
exclusion of Kerr McGee was revoked on 24 May 2006.
Chart 6 Timing of the exclusion of stocks from the Fund’s investment universe












Source: Norway’s Ministry of Finance.22
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due to the reaction of other market participants 
to the announcement.
We follow a simple methodology that allows 
for an identiﬁ  cation of abnormally high or low 
returns that cannot be explained by overall 
market factors but are idiosyncratic to the 
stock. We employ an augmented capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM) that relates the return 
of a given equity r to two explanatory factors: 
(i) the return of a domestic equity index RM, 
capturing  ﬁ   nancial market developments in 
the economy, and (ii) the return of a sector-
speciﬁ   c index RS, capturing sector-speciﬁ  c 
developments.25 
(1) From equation (1) parameter estimates are 
obtained for a sample of daily observations 
ranging from 2000 up to the date of exclusion. 
From these, expected returns E(r) are calculated 
for the period during which a particular equity 
was being removed from the Fund’s portfolio 
as well as for the day on which the exclusion 
was revealed to the public. In a second step, we 
test (i) whether the realised cumulated return 
over the period during which the equity was 
being excluded is signiﬁ  cantly different from 
the expected cumulated return based on the 
econometric model; and (ii) whether the realised 
return on the day on which the exclusion was 
made public is signiﬁ  cantly different from the 
expected return based on the econometric 
model.26
Table 8 reports abnormal returns during the 
divestment period for the 20 stocks that have 
been excluded during 2005–06. Overall the 
results indicate no signiﬁ   cant effect of the 
Fund’s divestment on the performance of the 
analysed stocks. Out of the 20 stocks, only ten 
underperformed their respective benchmarks 
during the divestment period and only nine 
stocks recorded a negative excess return on 
Sectoral and country indices are taken from Standard and  25 
Poor’s.
Assuming identically and independently normally distributed  26 
residuals in equation (1), i.e. εt~N(0,σ2), excess returns over the 
divestment period and on the day of publication of the exclusion 
follow a normal distribution.
Table 8 Stock performance during divestment period and upon announcement of exclusion














Alliant Techsystems Inc. 9.9 4.4 5.5 0.65 0.2 -0.2 0.3 0.86
BAE Systems Plc 10.3 12.9 -2.6 0.76 2.6 2.4 0.1 0.93
Boeing Co. 3.4 5.6 -2.2 0.83 0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.99
DRD Gold Ltd. -16.0 10.5 -26.4 0.37 2.3 1.6 0.7 0.91
EADS Co. 6.3 9.7 -3.4 0.81 0.2 2.3 -2.1 0.32
Finmeccanica Sp. A. -1.2 3.9 -5.1 0.67 0.3 -0.1 0.5 0.77
Freeport McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc. -0.4 1.4 -1.8 0.92 -0.6 0.9 -1.5 0.58
General Dynamics Corp. 4.1 2.8 1.3 0.89 0.2 -0.3 0.5 0.73
Honeywell International Corp. 3.8 4.4 -0.6 0.96 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.98
Kerr McGee Corp. -4.7 2.7 -7.4 0.36 -1.2 0.5 -1.7 0.49
L3 Communications Holdings Inc. 6.5 5.1 1.3 0.93 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 0.90
Lockheed Martin Corp. -3.0 3.4 -6.4 0.56 -0.7 -0.3 -0.4 0.83
Northrop Grumann Corp. 11.7 4.3 7.4 0.54 -0.8 0.0 -0.8 0.72
Poongsan Corp. 8.0 3.8 4.2 0.80 -1.5 0.0 -1.5 0.53
Raytheon Co. 0.0 1.4 -1.4 0.92 0.3 -0.3 0.7 0.77
Safran S.A. 5.2 2.0 3.3 0.88 1.4 -0.2 1.5 0.58
Thales S.A. 10.0 7.5 2.4 0.86 0.9 1.7 -0.7 0.72
United Technologies Corp. 11.2 6.8 4.3 0.69 1.1 0.9 0.2 0.90
Wal-Mart de Mexico S.A. 1.0 -2.6 3.6 0.75 -0.1 1.1 -1.2 0.47
Wal-Mart Stores Inc. -1.3 -13.2 11.8 0.17 2.1 3.3 -1.2 0.50
Sources: Bloomberg, Standard and Poor’s, authors’ calculations.
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the day the exclusion was made public. None 
of the negative excess returns is statistically 
signiﬁ  cant.
To sum up, we ﬁ  nd no evidence of a signiﬁ  cant 
impact of non-economically motivated 
investment behaviour of SWFs on ﬁ  nancial 
markets. However, it should be recalled that the 
process of divestment by Norway’s SWF is 
intentionally designed to avoid any downward 
price pressure in order to minimise the losses 
from divestment. As regards broader conclusions 
from this case study, it should be stressed that 
other SWFs could hold larger amounts of 
individual stocks than Norway’s SWF.27 The 
same applies to other large market players such 
as private asset managers.
Norway’s Government Pension Fund held, on average, around  27 
0.5% of the market capitalisation of the respective companies, 
roughly equivalent to the daily turnover of an average stock. 
In comparison, the combined value of global sovereign wealth 
funds may reach up to 3% of global ﬁ  nancial assets.24
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6 CONCLUDING  REMARKS
Sovereign wealth funds have been investing 
governments’ foreign assets for decades. 
However, it is only in recent times that such 
funds have emerged as managers of large 
“excess reserves” and other foreign assets. 
A transfer of sizeable amounts of traditional 
foreign exchange reserves to these investment 
vehicles may have an impact on the global 
ﬁ  nancial landscape since such funds are likely 
to pursue an investment strategy that differs 
considerably from that of central banks.
Whether a change in the global ﬁ  nancial 
structure will have a signiﬁ   cant impact on 
ﬁ  nancial stability will depend critically on the 
motives underlying the investment decisions 
of such funds. In fact, SWFs may contribute to 
a widening of the long-term investor base for 
risky assets such as stocks, corporate bonds, 
emerging market assets, private equity and real 
estate. In this regard, such funds could exert 
a stabilising effect on ﬁ   nancial markets, in 
particular as SWFs are typically not leveraged. 
In addition, SWFs may contribute to a more 
efﬁ  cient sharing and diversiﬁ  cation of risk at 
the global level.
On the other hand, other investment motives 
(e.g. when SWF acquisitions are driven by 
political considerations) could potentially 
lead to excessive risk-taking and a distortion 
of asset prices. For instance, some observers 
have expressed a concern that certain SWFs 
may be prone to an abrupt selling of assets, 
thereby contributing to market volatility. 
Other observers have warned that some 
SWFs may acquire stakes in companies of 
sensitive industries, and possibly bail out or 
support local ﬁ  rms for non-economic reasons. 
However, there is so far no ﬁ  rm evidence of 
such investment patterns which would also 
negatively impact market integrity.
On balance, several potential channels through 
which the emergence of SWFs as large 
global players may affect the global ﬁ  nancial 
system can be identiﬁ   ed. In this respect, it 
is of particular importance that SWFs be 
sufﬁ   ciently transparent on their size, asset 
allocation and investment motives so as to 
assuage concerns about potentially distorting 
the effects of SWFs and to reduce uncertainty 
in ﬁ  nancial markets. 25
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